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INFORMED CONSENT: A PLAINTIFF'S MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE "WONDER DRUG"
WILLIAM H. KAIcmwER*
I. Two CONFLICTING DUTIES
A. Duty Not To Un duy Alarm
The medical profession has been alerted to a new hazard of deal-
ing with their patients as a result of the decision in Ferrara v. Galluchio,'
where the New York Court of Appeals affirmed (four to three) the
supreme court's judgment for the plaintiff on a rather unique set of facts.
The action was medical malpractice against radiologists who in 1949
treated plaintiff with X-ray therapy for bursitis. An eruption in the treated
area left a marginated area of skin exhibiting telangiectasia, hyperpigmen-
tation, depigmentation and a suggestion of atrophy. By 1951, the plaintiff
was sufficiently concerned to consult a dermatologist, who suggested that
she continue to have the area checked about every six months because it
could become cancerous. Plaintiff's lawsuit against the radiologists sought,
inter alia, damages for cancerphobia (fear of future development of cancer)
which she claimed as a possible permanent injury. Of the $25,000 awarded,
$15,000 was for cancerphobia, and the validity of this part of the award
was the point raised on appeal. The majority opinion reasoned that the
original wrongdoer (the radiologists) is liable for the ultimate result though
the subsequent acts of another (the dermatologist) may have increased
the damage which would have otherwise resulted. The court refused to
make a distinction between mental and physical injury, seeing no sound
reason for doing so. In support of its decision the majority cited Milks v.
McIVer,2 which held that "liability for damages caused by wrong ceases
at a point dictated by public policy or common sense."3
*Law Clerk to Federal District Judge, Eastern and Western Districts of Mis-
souri; J.D., University of Missouri, 1965.
1. 5 N.Y.2d 16, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958), noted in 37 TExAs L. REv. 796
(1959); Contra, Kraus v. Spielberg. 37 Misc. 2d 519, 236 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct.
1962) in which no recovery was allowed. The patient claimed psychic injury when
her doctor in order to induce her to agree to chemotherapy at once, warned her
that tuberculosis germs may have invaded her intestines.
2. 264 N.Y. 267, 190 N.E. 487 (1934).
3. Id. at 269, 190 N.E. at 488.
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The lesson of Ferrara for the physician might well be that warning a
patient of a possible future ailment may subject the doctor to liability for
the mental anguish produced by unduly alarming him. This was not the
result of the Ferrara case, probably only because the patient's attorney
lacked the foresight or was unable to join the dermatologist as co-defendant.
B. Duty To Warn-Informed Consent
Only two years later, the Missouri Supreme Court announced the rule
in Mitchell v. Robinson:4
In the particular circumstances of this record, considering
the nature of Mitchell's illness and this rather new and radical pro-
cedure with its rather high incidence of serious and permanent
injuries not connected with the illness, the doctors owed their
patient in possession of his faculties the duty to inform him gen-
erally of the possible serious collateral hazards; and in the detailed
circumstances there was a submissible fact issue of whether the
doctors were negligent in failing to inform him of the dangers of
shock therapy.5
The opinion also pointed out that expert testimony was not required to
establish whether or not such a warning was given.
4. 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960).
5. Id. at 19. See Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1028 (1961); see also Annot., 99
A.L.R.2d 599, 614 (1965); 1 AVERBACH & BELLM, TORT AND MEDICAL YEARBOOK
455 and 631 (1961); Bellamy, Malpractice Risks Confronting the Psychiatrist:
Nationwide Fifteen-Year Study of Appellate Court Cases 1946,1961, 118 Am. J.
PSYCHIATRY 769 (1962), following which Dr. Wilse Robinson in a brief commentary
refers to himself as the "most sued psychiatrist in the world;" Franklin, Medical
Mass Screening Programs: A Legal Appraisal, 47 CORNELL L. Q. 205, 218 (1962);
Hendrix, Informed Consent-New Area of Malpractice Liability, June, 1960
MEDICOLEGAL DIGEST 11; Johnson, Medical Malpractice Doctrines of Res Ipsa
Loquitur and Informed Consent, 27 CoLo. L. REv. 182 (1965); McCleary, Torts
in Missouri, 27 Mo. L. REv. 81, 87-88 (1962); Oppenheim, Informed Consent to
Medical Treatment, 11 CLEVE.-MAR. L. REV. 249 (1962); Note, Doctors Held to
Have Duty to Disclose Risk Inherent in Proposed Treatment, 60 COLUM. L. REv.
1193 (1960); Note, Informed Consent-Reluctance of Doctors to Inform Patients
Often Renders Them Liable 'In Malpractice for Lack of "Informed Consent"', 11
CURRENT MEDICINE FOR ATrORNEYS 24 (1964); Note, Informed Consent-New
Theory of Liability-Doctor's Nightmare in Malpractice, 8 CURRENT MEDICINE FOR
ATroRsNYS 35 (1961); Note, Physicians and Surgeons-Physician's Duty to Warn
of Possible Adverse Results of Proposed Treatment Depends Upon General Prac-
tice Followed by Medical Profession in the Community, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1445
(1962); Note, Malpractice-Doctors Under Duty to Disclose Risk Inherent in
Proposed Treatment, 26-27 NACCA L.J. 134 (1960-1961); Note, Malpractice-
Physician Has a Duty to Inform Patient of Risk Inherent in Proposed Treatment,
109 U. PA. L. REv. 768 (1961); Comment, The Law of Medical 'Malpractice in
Missouri, 1962 W.U.L.Q. 402, 414-15.
[Vol. 31
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One of the greatest obstacles that a plaintiff must overcome in the
usual medical malpractice suit is the necessity of producing expert testi-
mony as to the standard of care and causation, 6 which has been compli-
cated by what Mr. Melvin Belli has referred to as the "conspiracy of
silence" among medical practitioners, signifying the difficulty of persuading
one physician to testify against another Surgeons and physicians in a
community work quite closely with one another, and have no desire to be
ostracized by members of their own profession. Further, by testifying
against another medical practitioner, they might find pressures brought to
bar them from the local medical society, the local hospitals, and even the
normal social relationships between the families of physicians. Even more
devastating is the possible inability to obtain medical malpractice insurance.
Such policies usually contain a clause permitting the company to cancel
at any time without giving a reason for doing so. The leverage of threatened
cancellation is an effective tool to seal the lips of many medical men, for
in view of the frequent and sizable malpractice awards, it is foolhardy even
to attempt the practice of medicine without adequate protection. 8 Appli-
6. Hornbeck v. Homeopathic Hospital Ass'n, 197 A.2d 461 (Super. Ct. Del.
1964); Hasemeier v. Smith, 361 S.W.2d 697, 700 (Mo. En Banc 1962); Williams v.
Chamberlain, 316 S.W.2d 505, 511 (Mo. 1958). See also Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 11,
31 (1950).
In Friedman, Handling the Unique Problems of Medical Malpractice Actions,
10 S.D.L. REv. 137, 151 (1965), it is suggested: "Under the 'informed consent'
cases the question of who a doctor should inform might be within the province of
a jury, but what he should have told them is a subject for expert testimony. In
their quest to avoid the necessity of expert testimony some courts have failed to
recognize the distinction."
7. BELLI, READY FOR THE PLAINTIFF, ch. 8.
8. See Schroeder, Insurance Protection and Damage Awards in Medical Mal-
practice, 25 Omlo ST. L.J. 323 (1964), warning at 334 that many policies do not.
include coverage for assault and -battery which is the true nature of a suit based on
lack of consent, informed or otherwise, and that larger awards are -predicated on
an assumption made by juries that all doctors are wealthy.
In Steincipher, Survey of Medical Professional Liability in Washington, 39
WAs. L. REv. 704 (1964), the author notes that there are approximately 9000
claims per year at an annual cost exceeding $45,000,000 and that one in every
seven doctors has been involved. A footnote calls attention to Disraeli's caveat
on the three kinds of lies---"lies, damn lies, and statistics." The author's figures
were taken from Silverman, Medicine's Legal Nightmare, Saturday Evening Post,
Apr. 11, 1959 pp. 13, 14, first of a series of three articles appearing in No. 41 at 13,
No. 42 at 31, and No. 43 at 36 (1959). Silverman says that the cost is even
greater because doctors are calling for more and more diagnostic procedures, con-
sultations, laboratory tests, hospitalization, and nursing care, when not demanded
by good medical practice, but only to protect against malpractice claims. He
quotes one California physician who confessed, "God help me, I'm beginning to
decide my treatments not on the basis of what's best for the patient, but what
will look best in court."
19661
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cations for policies normally ask whether or not a comparable policy
has ever been cancelled by any other company, and an affirmative answer
to this inquiry almost invariably results in a refusal to issue a policy to
'the applicant. Cancellation is tantamount to branding the physician as a
bad risk.
In a jurisdiction following the Missouri doctrine, the attorney for the
plaintiff in a medical malpractice action may be able to avoid the necessity
of obtaining expert testimony by utilizing the theory of failure to obtain
an "informed consent" from the patient. The result of Mitchell has been
that in many recent medical malpractice actions there has been a specific
allegation of negligence in failing to obtain the patient's informed consent.9
Considering the Ferrara and Mitchell cases together, the doctor is
faced with a dilemma: should he risk the failure to warn a patient of possi-
ble collateral hazards of treatment (Quaere whether this would include
hazards of lion-treatment) and be liable under Mitchell, or should he make
a full and complete disclosure of the risks and possibly incur responsibility
for the results suggested as possible under Ferrara? Underlying this whole
area is the basic concept that a doctor's first duty is to do what is best
for his patient under the particular circumstances.10 The problem seems in-
soluble; perhaps the most informative approach would be to consider
9. Note that even Dr. Ben Casey of TV fame was charged with failure to
obtain an informed consent in his malpractice trial aired during the fall of 1965.
Dr. Casey avoided liability when the plaintiff dismissed after the jury advised the
court it was unable to reach a verdict.
10. In Roberts v. Woods, 206 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Ala. 1962) the patient
daimed she was not warned of the seriousness of the operation, though she had
had a comparable operation by the same surgeon five years previously. The court,
affirming a judgment for defendant, said at 583: "I do not mean to suggest that
defendant should have told plaintiff of all the hazards involved, including risk of
injury to the recurrent laryngeal nerve. Doctors frequently tailor the extent of
their pre-operative warnings to the particular patient, and with this I can find
no fault. Not only is much of the risk of a technical nature beyond the patient's
understanding, but the anxiety, apprehension, and fear generated by a full dis-
closure thereof may have a very detrimental effect on some patients. In this case
the defendant told the patient, among other things, that the operation would be
similar to the one she had undergone in 1954. In view of the patient's emotional
state and her concern over this operation as well as a gynecological operation to be
performed at the same time, in addition to having previously experienced a
thyroidectomy, I am of the opinion the patient was properly advised of the seri-
ousness of the operation." See also, McCleary, Torts in Missouri, 27 Mo. L. REv.
81, 88 (1962); Oberst, 1960 Annual Survey of American Law-Torts, 36 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 416, 426 (1961) explaining: "While courts frequently state the obligation
as one of full and frank disclosure, they have invariably waived the requirement
upon some showing by the physician that it was done to avoid depressing or ex-
citing the patient." See 109 U. PA. L. Ruv. 768, 773 (1961) supra note 5.
(Vol. 31
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what courts have said and done when faced with the "informed consent"
problem and what legal and medical scholars have to say about it.
II. THE AMERICAN DECISIONS
Only two days after the Missouri Supreme Court announced the
Mitchell decision, the Kansas Supreme Court rendered its opinion in
Natanson v. Kline," which involved a doctor administering cobalt irradia-
tion treatment that caused injury to the patient. On appeal from a judg-
ment for the defendants, the Kansas court said:
[W]here the patient fully appreciates the danger involved, the
failure of the physician in his duty to make a reasonable disclosure
to the patient would have no causal relation to the injury. In such
event the consent of the patient to the proposed treatment is an in-
formed consent.12
Reversing for error in instructions, the opinion reads:
The appellant's requested instruction on the duty of a physi-
cian to make a disclosure to his patient was too broad.... On re-
trial the instruction should be modified to inform the jury that a
physician has such discretion, as heretofore indicated, consistent
with the full disclosure of facts necessary to assure an informed
consent by the patient.'8
In denying the application for rehearing, the court seized the opportunity to
clarify its earlier opinion:
Conceivably, in a given case as indicated in the opinion, no
disclosures to a patient may be justified where such practice, un-
der given facts and circumstances, is established by expert testi-
mony to be in accordance with that of a reasonable medical prac-
titioner under the same or similar circumstances. ...
Whether or not a physician has advised his patient of the
inherent risks and hazards in a proposed form of treatment is a
question of fact concerning which lay witnesses are competent to
testify, and the establishment of such fact is not dependent upon
expert medical testimony. It is only when the facts concerning the
actual disclosures made to the patient are ascertained, or ascer-
tainable by the trier of facts, that the expert testimony of medical
11. 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, rehearing denied with clarification 187 Kan.
186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
12. d. 186 Kan. at 410, 350 P.2d at 1106.
13. Id. 186 Kan. at 411, 350 P.2d at 1107.
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witnesses is required to establish whether such disclosures are in
accordance with those which a reasonable medical practitioner
would make under the same or similar circumstances.
If, of course, the appellant would have taken the cobalt irradiation
treatments even though Dr. Kline had warned her that the treat-
ments he undertook to administer involved great risk of bodily
injury or death, it could not be said that the failure of Dr. Kline to
so inform the appellant was the proximate cause of her injury.
While the appellant did not directly testify that she would have
refused to take the proposed cobalt irradiation treatments had she
been properly informed, we think the evidence presented by the
record taken as a whole is sufficient and would authorize a jury
to infer that had she been properly informed, the appellant would
not have taken the cobalt irradiation treatments.14
The Kansas court in 1963 was presented the opportunity to further
explain "informed consent" in deciding the case of Williams v. Menelan,15
in which both parties relied on the Natanson decision, each placing a dif-
ferent construction on what the court had said. The conflict was resolved
when the court stated that a physician's duty to disclose is limited to
disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner would make under the
same or similar circumstances and that in the Williams case, the trial
court did not err in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss because
plaintiff offered no evidence of what reasonable physicians would do under
like circumstances. 16 Surely it is clear that where Missouri has said expert
testimony is not necessary to show that the doctor failed to warn, Kansas
will require expert medical testimony that the standard of care of reason-
able physicians would include giving a warning. These propositions would
not necessarily conflict except that the Mitchell decision makes the doctor's
duty appear to be a matter of law, while in Natanson and Williams, it
would seem that the duty of the doctor, based on the standard of care,
must be established by expert medical testimony in each case. Because of
the greatly divergent factual situations in the malpractice cases, and be-
cause medical practitioners do not guarantee cures, but only have a duty
to use the skill and exercise the care that other reasonable medical practi-
tioners would utilize in the same or similar circumstances, it is submitted
that the Kansas doctrine offers greater flexibility and seems to be a more
equitable principle of law.
14. 187 Kan. 186, 189-91, 354 P.2d 670, 673-74 (1960).
15. 191 Kan. 6, 379 P.2d 292 (1963).
16. Id. at 10-11, 379 P.2d at 295.
(Vol. 31
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One writer has suggested that Mitchell means a doctor must itemize
in detail every conceivable and imaginable result, and if he omits one
which takes place, he will be subject to liability.17 In Williams, however, the
opinion stated:
But this does not mean that a doctor is under an obligation to
describe in detail all of the possible consequences of treatment. To
make a complete disclosure of all facts, diagnoses and alternatives
or possibilities which might occur to the doctor could so alarm the
patient that it would, in fact, constitute bad medical practice.'
8
The Kansas court would permit the doctor to be exempt from liability if
he was motivated in not warning only by the patient's best therapeutic
interests and proceeded as other competent medical men would have done
in such a situation.
Possibly another distinction should be drawn: Mitchell was concerned
with electroshock therapy and Natanson dealt with cobalt irradiation treat-
ment, both extremely hazardous treatments at the time they were given,
but Williams was not an instance of such a new and dangerous procedure.
It is arguable that with the present widespread laymen's knowledge of
medicine, the hazards of the more dangerous treatments are best known
to the patient, and require no warning. On the other hand, this premise
would produce the result that the doctor's duty, to warn would be greatest
in the least hazardous procedures, and this is illogical on its face. Super-
imposed on the problem of when the doctor should warn is the question
of whether or not the patient is under a duty to ask of the hazards, to
demand an explanation if it is not offered, and whether in not doing so,
the patient can be said to have assumed the risk or to have been con-
tributorily negligent. 9
In Fischer v. Wilminigton Geveral Hospital,20 the patient contracted
17. Comment, The Law of Medical Malpractice in Missouri, 1962 W.U.L.Q.
402, 416, n.75.
18. Supra note 14, at 8, 379 P.2d at 294.
19. Carroll v. Chapman, 139 So. 2d 61, 66 (La. App. 1962) cert. denied;
Crippen v. Pulliam, 61 Wash.2d 725, 380 P.2d 475, 479 (1963); See Lund, The
Doctor, The Patient, and The Truth, 19 TENN. L. REV. 344 (1946) at 345 where
the physician-author says: "In any group of patients with identical surgical or
medical conditions, there will be a wide variation in their mental states, physical
states, social circumstances, and in the amount of information or misinformation
concerning disease in their possession." But see, in reply, H. W. Smith, Therapeutic
Privilege to Withhold Specific Diagnosis From Patient Sick with Serious or Fatal
Illness, 19 TENN. L. REv. 349 (1946), maintaining that disclosure in each case is a
matter of professional judgment.
20. 51 Del. 554, 149 A.2d 749 (Super. Ct. Del. 1959).
1966]
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serum hepatitis from a whole blood transfusion given to her when she
arrived at the hospital after having an abortion elsewhere, and she was not
warned of this possible adverse result. There was evidence that it was not
the general practice in the local medical profession to give such a warning
and that the incidence of this disease following transfusion was between
.45 and 1.00 per cent. The court held this was not even a jury question,
but, as a matter of law, the hospital had not been negligent.
Hall v. United States2l involved the wife of a serviceman who went
to a naval hospital to be delivered of her child. She suffered harmful effects
when given a spinal anaesthetic, and alleged she had not been warned of
the possible injury. The court announced:
I hold there was no duty upon defendant's agents in this case to
warn Mrs. Hall of possible consequences or to obtain her specific
consent to a spinal anaesthetic. (emphasis by the court.) 22
It was further said that it is common knowledge that anaesthetic is used
in childbirth, and that by entering the hospital for that specific purpose,
she impliedly consented to standard procedure.
While the case does not deal with informed consent, the language of
Dietze v. King23 may be applicable. The physician performed a radical
mastectomy on the plaintiff, left a surgical sponge in her body, and failed
to tell her of this when he knew she was leaving for England. The judge
signified the defendant's duty by saying:
The physician owes a duty to his patient to make reasonable dis-
closures of all significant facts under the circumstances of the then
situation. This duty is, however, limited to those disclosures which
a reasonable medical practitioner would make under the same or
similar circumstances, and the failure to disclose in all instances
does not necessarily suggest a neglect of duty.24
In the area of consent to medical treatment, the landmark case is a
Minnesota decision, 25 and thus the case of Bang v. Charles T. Miller
21. 136 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. La. 1955), aff'd per curiam 234 F.2d 811 (5th
Cir. 1956).
22. Id. 136 F. Supp. at 193.
23. 184 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Va. 1960).
24. Id. at 949.
25. Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905); overruled on another
point in 248 Minn. 527, 80 N.W.2d 854 (1957). See Annot., 76 A.L.R. 562 (1932).
On the topic of consent to medical treatment or surgery, see generally Kelly, The
Physician, The Patient, and The Consent, 8 KAN. L. Ray. 405 (1960); Comment,
Consent to Surgical Operations, 26 ALBANY L. Ray. 25 (1962); Comment, Consent
[Vol. 31
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1966], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/10
INFORMED CONSENT
Hosp.26 is of particular interest. The patient was suffering from prostate
trouble and the physician performed a transurethal prostatic resection that
to Medical and Surgical Treatment, 14 DRAxE L. REV. 101 (1965); Note, Medical
Surgical Conrent, 20 N.Y.U. ImrmA. L. REv. 114 (1965); and McCoid, A Reap-
praisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MiNN. L. Ray. 381
(1957), relied on heavily in the Mitchell opinion, particularly at 427 where the
author states: "[The doctor owes a duty to his patient to make reasonable dis-
closures of all significant facts, i.e., the nature of the infirmity (so far as reasonably
possible), the nature of the operation and some of the more probable consequences
and difficulties inherent in the proposed operation. It may be said that a doctor
who fails to perform this duty is guilty of malpractice." The suggestion is made at
434: "One particular obligation which the law may properly exact or impose, how-
ever, is the obligation to make a reasonable disclosure to the patient of the nature
of his illness or infirmity, the nature of the treatment proposed and the danger of
using such treatment or alternative treatment, and then permit the patient to de-
cide whether to submit to the treatment or not. To overcome any difficulties of
proof, the law may also properly create a presumption that where the patient has
not given express consent to the operation or treatment, there has been a deviation
from the standard of proper medical care, which presumption will impose upon
the doctor the onus of coming forward with justification of his conduct by the
use of qualified medical evidence.'"
But in McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 Vum. L. REv.
549, 590-91 (1959) McCoid wrote: "But this does not mean that a doctor is under
an obligation to describe in great detail all of the possible consequences of treat-
ment. Indeed it might be argued that to make a complete disclosure of all facts,
diagnoses and alternatives or possibilities which may occur to the doctor could
so unduly alarm the patient that it would constitute bad medical practice . . .
The 'golden mean' between the two extremes of absolute silence and exhaustive
discussion is well described in Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees
[154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957):] ...
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to
liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of
an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment. Likewise
the physician may not minimize the known dangers of a procedure or
operation in order to induce his patient's consent. At the same time, the
physician must place the welfare of his patient above all else and this
very fact places him in a position in which he must sometimes choose be-
tween two alternative courses of action. One is to explain to the patient
every risk attendant upon any surgical procedure or operation, no matter
how remote; this may well result in alarming a patient who is already un-
duly apprehensive and who may as a result refuse to undertake surgery
in which there is in fact minimal risk; it may also result in actually in-
creasing the risks by reason of the psychological result of the apprehension
itself. The other is to recognize that each patient presents a separate
problem, that the patient's mental and emotional condition is important
and in certain cases may be crucial, and that in discussing the element of
risk, a certain amount of discretion must be employed consistent with the
full disclosure necessary for an informed consent.
"... . [T~he duty to disclose may be limited to those disclosures which a rea-
sonable medical practitioner would make under the same or similar circumstances,
possibly with a presumption on the part of the courts that disclosure will be made
where the consequences are serious and substantially certain to occur."
See Bradford v. Winter, 215 Cal. App. 2d 448, 30 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1963);
Rothe v. Hull, 352 Mo. 926, 180 S.W.2d 7 (1944). That consent can be given by
conduct, see O'Brien v. Cunard S. S. Co., 154 Mass. 272, 28 N.E. 266 (1891) hold-
1966]
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resulted in sterilization of the patient. The ailment could have been
treated medically or surgically, and the court held the doctor was under
a duty to inform the patient of the alternative procedures available and let
the patient make the choice. The decision is not the best authority for an
informed consent case, though it is frequently used, because the injury
suffered was not a collateral hazard of the operation, but a part of the
procedure to be accomplished. Moreover, if plaintiff was a man of advanced
age, it would seem questionable what actual damages he might have shown.
Over a hundred years ago, it was held in Twombly v. Leah, 27 that it is
good medical practice in some cases for physicians to withhold from a
patient the extent of their disease and their actual condition, and that
testimony of expert and experienced medical practitioners on this point is
material and peculiarly appropriate.
An attempt was made to use the informed consent doctrine in Block
v. McVay.2s There the doctor made a non-negligent mistake in diagnosis
when he determined the patient had a lymph node tumor, the removal of
which is a simple, ordinary and frequently performed procedure usually
producing no ill effects. After removing the tumor, the defendant discovered
that it was a neurofibroma, the removal of which does involve risk. The
trial court's directed verdict for the doctor was affirmed on appeal.
A patient was the subject of a thyroidectomy by a doctor in DeFilippo
v. Preston,2 9 following which it was alleged that failure to obtain an in-
formed consent of the patient caused injury to the plaintiff. The Delaware
court held that whether such a duty existed depends upon the circumstances
of the particular case, and the general practice of the medical profession in
giving warnings in such a case. The evidence showed a custom of the pro-
fession to warn did not exist for thyroidectomies and the court made it
dear that such evidence can only come from experts in the medical profes-
sion.
A directed verdict for the doctor was appealed in Govin v. Hunters0
(surgery to correct varicose veins in the legs more severe than the patient
had anticipated) where no expert testimony was adduced at trial. The
court explained:
ing that where plaintiff held out her arm for a vaccination, she consented to it
being given by the doctor.
26. 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958).
27. 65 Mass. (Cushing XI) 397 (1853).
28. 126 N.W.2d 808 (S.D. 1964).
29. 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961).
30. 374 P.2d 421 (Wyo. 1962).
[Vol. 31
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We realize that under certain circumstances a physician has a
duty to reveal any serious risks which are involved in a contem-
plated operation. But, how a physician chooses to discharge his obli-
gation to a patient involves a question of medical judgment. As
long as his disclosure is sufficient to assure an informed consent,
and if it appears that he proceeded as competent medical men
would have done in a similar situation, the physician's actions
should not be called into question.3 '
The following page of the opinion paraphrased much of what had been
said in DeFilippo and Natason.
A case quite like Mitchell on the facts was Woods v. Brmnlop,32 which
involved a fracture resulting from electro-shock therapy, but also included
a loss of hearing. The plaintiff claimed she was told there would be no
harmful results. Possibly her action might better have been for misrepre-
sentation, but she based her suit on professional negligence in failing to
obtain the informed consent of the patient. The New Mexico court an-
nounced the rule for that jurisdiction, recognizing that some courts make
exceptions in cases (1) of emergency and (2) where an explanation of
every risk would unduly alarm an already apprehensive patient who
might as a result refuse treatment even though the risk involved is minimal
or where the disclosure might actually increase the risk due to psychological
results of the apprehension. Each patient should be treated as a separate
problem dependent on his mental and emotional condition, the court said,
but it left open the questions of who shall make the determination in a
given case and what standards the doctor was safe in using if the decision
was allocated to him. The judgment for plaintiff was reversed on appeal
because the jury was not instructed on the exceptions to the general rule
and the plaintiff had not successfully borne the burden of proof on the
issue of causation. The court explained that if the doctor did not give
honest answers about the risks he is liable unless he falls within one of the
exceptions and whether or not he warned was a fact issue for the jury to
decide without the assistance of expert testimony.
Crippen v. Pvuliam33 dealt with a fifteen year old delinquent girl who
had been made a ward of the court and placed in the Home of the Good
Shepherd in Seattle. After a written consent was obtained from her father,
she was operated on for a hearing defect, but was left with facial paralysis
31. Id. at 423.
32. 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962).
33. 61 Wash. 2d 725, 380 P.2d 475 (1963).
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and a schizophrenic condition. The plaintiff contended at trial that the
consent was obtained by misrepresentation, but the court on appeal affirmed
a judgment for the doctor:
Moreover, the father was not limited in any way in making in-
quiry concerning the details of the surgery. It was his prerogative
to rely on the professional judgment of the defendant without mak-
ing further inquiry.3 4
Alaska too, has had to contend with this relatively new legal theory.
In Patrick v. Sedwick,85 the trial court rendered a judgment for defendant
which was appealed. Alaska's Supreme Court reversed and ordered a find-
ing for plaintiff on grounds other than "informed consent." Following a
subtotal thyroidectomy, plaintiff's vocal cords were paralyzed and she ex-
perienced difficulty in breathing. She maintained that the doctor, in ob-
taining her consent did not warn of the possible hazards. She had asked the
doctor if there was any possible danger of her goiter returning, and he
told her there was no guarantee about it. Her brief contended that had
she been warned of the possibility of this injury, she would not have con-
sented to the operation, but there was no evidence to that effect at trial.
The doctor said he made it a practi e to see patients before surgery, at
which time he made a decision of whether information concerning serious
risks should be disclosed or withheld, based upon the disposition and
psychological makeup of the patient. On the informed consent theory, the
court commented:
There is good law in support of the argument made by de-
fendant in his brief that the doctor need not inform the patient of
all the hazards involved in an operation; that doctors frequently
tailor the extent of their preoperative warnings to the particular
patient to avoid the unnecessary anxiety and apprehension which
such appraisal might arouse in the mind of the patient. In the
light of the evidence in this case and the law bearing on informed
consent, we cannot say that the failure of the trial court to make a
finding of informed consent was clearly erroneous. 0
Kansas had another opportunity to clarify its position in Yeates v.
Harms,3 7 a malpractice action resulting from cataract surgery. Affirming
the judgment for the doctor, the court explained:
34. Id. at 732, 380 P.2d at 479.
35. 387 P.2d 294 and 391 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1964) noted in 38 TrMp. L.Q.
238 (1965).
36. 391 P.2d 453, 458 (Alaska 1964).
37. 193 Kan. 320, 393 P.2d 982 (1964).
[Vol. 31
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A careful examination of plaintiff's requested instructions re-
veals that in his concept of the case he goes too far and would
have this court extend the duty of a physician or surgeon to the
extreme where he would have to apprise his patient not only of
the known risks but also of each infinitesimal, imaginative, or
speculative element that would go into making up such risks. This
is another hurdle we simply cannot make. Here we are faced with
a record that does not disclose any competent substantial evidence
as to the actna cause of infection in plaintiff's right eye, and we
cannot indulge in conjecture on this pivotal point s
One problem of properly informing a patient is demonstrated by Corn
v. French3,9 where the doctor told the patient he was going to perform a
mastectomy and had her sign a consent form for this procedure. When the
anaesthetic wore off and the plaintiff discovered her breast had been re-
moved, she sued because she said she had told the doctor repeatedly she
did not want the breast removed an that he never explained to her the
meaning of the word "mastectomy." The trial court granted the doctor's
motion to dismiss, but the Nevada Supreme Court held it was for the jury
to determine whether or not there had been a consent given for the opera-
tion when the evidence was in conflict.
If the medical practitioner who attempts to follow the Mitchell
doctrine is aware of the plaintiff's theory in Corn, he not only will be
under a duty to explain each and every risk of injury that might be asso-
ciated with a proposed treatment, but he also will be obliged to ascertain
that the patient has a complete understanding of every technical medical
term employed in the warning given. It would seem that in some procedures
this could amount to medical education and instruction in subjects which
require years of study and practice for a doctor to master. As a matter of
social policy, there must be a choice between having physicians take the
time to make such a detailed and thorough analysis for every patient,
which will result in fewer patients treated by each doctor, and the risk of
having an occasional patient suffer an adverse result to which he would not
otherwise have exposed himself had he been aware of the risk of that con-
sequence. With the minimal number of physicians available, the choice
seems dear. And if the first proposition were adopted, is the average layman
sufficiently well versed in medical experience to evaluate properly all the
technical information given to him even if he does understand it? It seems
38. Id. at 333, 393 P.2d at 991.
39. 71 Nev. 280, 289 P.2d 173 (1955).
19661
13
Karchmer: Karchmer: Informed Consent
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
less than reasonable to so maintain when we admit that even a doctor is
not responsible for non-negligent errors of judgment because medicine is
not an exact science.40
Of course, no argument is being made that physicians should not be
held liable for practices such as those of the defendant in Theodore v.
Ellis.-" There the patient consented to an operation in reliance on what the
doctor told him when the doctor knew or should have known the procedure
was unnecessary, and the same result could be obtained without surgery.
A distinction also should be made between failure to warn and mis-
representation. In Hunter v. Barrough s,4 2 it was held that a physician's
failure to warn a patient that use of a particular remedy possibly could
have adverse consequences is not negligence per se, but where a physician
not only fails to warn of dangers of a certain treatment but also gives
positive assurance of a cure, he is liable for harmful consequences of the
treatment, where, if such warning had been given, the patient would not
have taken the treatment. The evil to be avoided is the combination of
misleading the plaintiff as to the risks involved and also warranting a cure.
Lester v. Aetna Casualty & SUrety Co.43 held that a psychiatrist who
administered electroshock therapy relying on consent of the wife of the
patient was not negligent because under the circumstances, he properly ob-
tained consent from someone who could act for the patient while he was
incompetent to consent for himself. A Missouri decision44 on which the
Missouri Supreme Court relied heavily for the decision in Mitchell attains
the same result as Lester. In the Lester opinion, there is also language indi-
cating that by soliciting treatment, the patient assented to all treat-
ment proffered by the doctor which the patient did not resist.43
The doctor was not held negligent in Harwick v. Harris" when the
patient sued for failure to obtain an informed consent for surgery performed
by another physician (Dr. Russell) to whom defendant had referred the
plaintiff. In the companion case of Rilssell v. Harwick ' 7 the dissent points
out:
40. See 10 S.D. L. REV. 137, 151 n.96 (1965), supra note 6: "For excellent
illustrations of the inexactness of medical science and the role chance plays in res
ipsa loquitur cases, see C. L. Wilson, M. C. Wilson & Heilbron, Malpractice-
Negligence or Misfortune?, [1962 MED. TRIAL TEcH. Q. 83)."
41. 141 La. '709, 75 So. 655 (1917).
42. 123 Va. 113, 96 S.E. 360 (1918).
43. 240 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1957), rehearing denied.
44. Steele v. Woods, 327 S.W.2d 187 (Mo. 1959).
45. Supra note 43, at 679.
46. 166 So. 2d 912 (Fla. App. 1964).
47. 166 So. 2d 904 (Fla. App. 1964).
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The patient in most cases has no desires to have the physician
describe all the details. However, if the patient wishes to have
such a description, it would be his duty to inquire and the physi-
cian's duty to give reasonable and prudent answers.4
The majority affirmed the trial court's holding that there was sufficient evi-
dence to go to the jury.
In Kennedy v. Parrott,49 the opinion affirming a non-suit of the plaintiff
raises a cautionary note:
[T]he law should encourage self-reliant surgeons to whom patients
may safely entrust their bodies and not men who may be tempted
to shirk from duty for fear of a law suit .... The law does not in-
sist that a surgeon perform every operation according to plans and
specifications approved in advance by the patient, and carefully
tucked away in his office-safe for courtroom purposes."0
Where one has voluntarily submitted himself to a physician
or surgeon for diagnosis and treatment of an ailment it, in the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrary, will be presumed that what the
doctor did was either expressly or by implication authorized to be
done. 1
Kennedy was an operation for what the doctor thought was only to be an
appendectomy. In the course of the surgery, he found and removed cysts on
the patient's ovaries, as a result of which she filed this action. The doctor's
operating room quandry was presented thus:
Was it his duty to leave her unconscious on the operating table,
doff his operating habiliments, and go forth to find someone with
authority to consent to the extended operation, and then return,
go through the process of disinfecting, don again his operating
habiliments, and then puncture the cysts; or was he compelled,
against his best judgment to close the incision and then, after the
plaintiff had fully recovered from the effects of the anesthesia,
inform her as to what he had found . . . . Reason and common
sense dictated that he should do just what he did do.52
It was held in Roberts v. Young53 that whether a surgeon before operat-
ing should advise the patient of all possible results and risks must be
48. Id. at 912.
49. 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956).
50. Id. at 361, 90 S.E.2d at 758.
51. Id. at 363, 90 S.E.2d at 759.
52. Id. at 362-63, 90 S.E.2d 760.
53. 369 Mich. 133, 119 N.W.2d 627 (1963).
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determined with reference to the general practice customarily followed by
the medical profession in the locality. The judgment for defendant in that
case was affirmed with the comment "[W]e are not dealing with a known
existing condition, but rather with a mere possibility . . . ."54 The Bang
case, discussed above, was distinguished as a case where there was a result
certain to happen as opposed to a mere possibility here.
Dentists also have been charged with failure to disclose possible risks
of treatment. In Ericksen v. Wilsonr5 the defendant agreed to remove two
of plaintiff's teeth, but did not tell the patient that since one of the teeth
to be extracted extended into plaintiff's sinus, a medical operation might
be necessary afterwards to close the sinus, although the defendant antici-
pated, this would be likely. After the extraction, he performed necessary
suturing and an oral fistula developed for which plaintiff filed suit. On
appeal, the trial court's judgment for the dentist was affirmed; he was not
required to advise plaintiff in advance of this risk, and further, the burden
of proof on the issue of causation5s belonged to plaintiff and expert testi-
mony was lacking to establish this point.
Two lawsuits resulted from what transpired after the patient's mother
took him, a nine year old boy, to Dr. Baxter who recommended that the
patient be examined by Dr. Storch, a neurologist. Dr. Storch recommended
an arteriogram as an alternative to psychiatric treatment. There was evi-
dence that three per cent of such procedures were known to result in death.
In this case, partial paralysis was produced. Dr. Storch had arranged for
Dr. Talmage to administer the necessary anaesthetic. Plaintiff filed suits
against both Storch and, Talmage and the companion cases of Bowers v.
Talmaga and Bowers v. Storck were consolidated for purposes of appeal
after both doctors prevailed below. Dr. Talmage's lack of negligence was
affirmed, but Dr. Storch's judgment was reversed and remanded on the
theory that he failed to get an informed consent when medical testimony
of neurosurgeons showed it was customary to warn patients of the risks
of this dangerous procedure. There was conflict in the evidence as to
54. Id. at 139, 119 N.W.2d at 630.
55. 266 Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687 (1963).
56. Glazer v. Adams, 391 P.2d 195 (Wash. 1964) was an affirmance in favor
of the doctor on the basis that the plaintiff failed to prove causation. One of the
allegations in the complaint was failure to obtain an informed consent. Accord,
Reder v. Hanson, 338 F.2d (8th Cir. 1964); Barnes v. Bovenmyer, 255 Iowa 220,
122 N.W.2d 312 (1963); Thomas v. Beckering, 391 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965); Hart v. VanZandt, 17 Negl. Cas.2d 13 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Roberts v.
Gale, 139 S.E.2d 272 (W. Va. 1964).
57. 159 So. 2d 888 (Fla. App. 1964).
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whether or not Dr. Storch had given a warning and thus there was a ques-
tion of fact which should have gone to the jury, and the directed verdict
was error.
Wilson v. Lehiman58 concerned a patient who lost his memory as a
result of electroshock therapy. The patient alleged the doctor was negligent
in failing to warn of this risk and thus did not obtain an informed consent.
The trial court's judgment for the doctor was affirmed on appeal because
plaintiff failed to introduce evidence of causation connecting the alleged
negligence and loss of memory. The opinion cites 70 CJ.S. Pkzysicians and
Surgeons § 62, p. 991 (1951): "In the absence of evidence showing
that the patient was the victim of false representations, his consent to
treatment or to an operation will be presumed from the fact that he volun-
tarily submitted to it.""9
Ball v. Mallinkrodt Ckemical Works60 was appealed on the issue of
whether it was error to instruct the jury that the physician had a duty
to obtain an informed consent. The instruction contained much language
from the case of Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr., Univ. Bd. of Trusteessl in
which the seeds for the doctrine of informed consent were sown. The charge
was held to be correct, for it was based on expert evidence of causation
before the jury and the jury was also instructed that the reason justifying
a physician's faliure to warn the patient in every case is the possibility of
upsetting the patient and that each patient must be judged by he
physician in charge.
One of the more limited views on "informed consent" was expressed
in Watson v. CluttsG2 (subtotal thyroidectomy in which the doctor told
the plaintiff the procedure was "not without risk") where it was said that in
an average case, the doctor need only disclose dangers peculiar to the
treatment proposed and of which it is likely that the patient is unaware.
Furthermore, the doctor's duty is to do what is best for his patient,
and any conflict between that duty and making a frightening disclosure
ordinarily should be resolved in favor of the primary duty.
That it requires expert testimony to establish that a definable and sub-
stantial risk exists in the circumstances, and that this was or should have
been known to the surgeon in attendance, was the holding of the court in
58. 379 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. App. 1964).
59. Id. at 480.
60. 381 S.W.2d 583 (Tenn. App. 1964).
61. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
62. 262 N.C. 153, 136 S.E.2d 617 (1964).
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Haggerty v. McCarthy.63 The opinion cautioned that only upon such a
showing can a duty be found to discuss and disclose the risk.
Patients often try to recover for breach of contract 64 where a doctor
is so lacking in caution that he promises a result. Arguably, under the
informed consent doctrine, a case could arise where the plaintiff would
maintain that the doctor failed to warn of the danger that the contracted-
for procedure might not succeed. 65 Typical of the contract attack was Ball v.
Madge,6 6 where the plaintiffs (husband and wife) contracted with the de-
fendant doctor for sterilization of the husband by means of a vasectomy
to protect the wife against the dangers of another Caesarean section (she
had undergone three in as many years) and to protect the family against
an increase they could not economically afford. The operation was per-
formed, November 1, 1957, and four to six weeks later, the husband was
instructed by defendant that he could safely resume sexual relations with
his wife and need not employ any contraceptives. In November, 1958, the
wife learned that she was pregnant. She bore a healthy child by Caesarean
section in August, 1959, with no adverse effect on mother or child. The
court affirmed the jury's finding that any negligence or breach of warranty
on the part of defendant was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff-hus-
band's fertility on or immediately prior to November, 1958. Moreover, it
was held that plaintiffs could show no damage from the birth of a normal,
healthy child. 67
Where plaintiff was an involutional psychosis paranoid type who signed
a voluntary admission paper, it was held in Belger v. Arnot 6s that:
The plaintiff's signature to the voluntary admission paper was a
consent to all treatment given subsequent to November 12, it not
being contended that she was in no condition to sign or that she
did so because of any misrepresentation.6"
63. 344 Mass. 136, 181 N.E.2d 562 (1962).
64. See Note, Obligations-Doctor-Patient Suits-Possibility of Contractual
Recovery for Malpractice, 39 TuL. L. R-v. 143 (1964).
65. Cf. Welch, Medical Testimony and Professional Liability, 1964 INSuANCE
L.J. 673, 676: "No one would seriously suggest that a trial judge acting in the
exercise of his best judgment should be personally responsible for the cost of ap-
peal to a higher court because his decision is held to be erroneous. Likewise, there
is no legitimate basis for imposing legal liability upon a physician for the mistakes
in judgment which are inherent in the practice of an inexact science even though
he possesses reasonable competence and exercises reasonable care."
66. 391 P.2d 201 (Wash. 1964).
67. The opinion fails to state whether the question of the paternity of the
child was raised by the defendant.
68. 344 Mass. 679, 183 N.E.2d 866 (1962).
69. Id. at 686, 183 N.E.2d at 870.
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In Carroll v. Chapman,70 this caveat appears:
It is not to be presumed that as a general rule a patient
would submit to major surgery without inquiring into the risk
involved and the possible after-effects. The presumption is contrari-
wise with reference to a minor operation where the probability of
ill consequences is rather remote.
We may observe that the relationship between a doctor and
his patient is such that exact agreements are the exception rather
than the rule. This is certainly true in cases where minor surgery
and professional services are rendered and which do not involve a
major affliction. We opine that in the latter situations the courts
have no intention of placing a handicap upon the ordinary functions
performed by the professional medic nor to disturb the proper re-
lationship between him and his patient.
.... We have concluded she gave her implied consent and that
her real grievance is occasioned by the result of the operation,
which, however, does not sustain liability.
7 1
That a doctor has a duty to impress upon a patient the need for an
operation and the reasons therefor, provided, of course, the operation is
really necessary, was the holding in State v. FishelY2
A passenger in defendant's bus was injured when the bus driver went
off the road. The case styled Kaiser v. Suburban Transportation System"3
was a suit by the passenger against the transportation company, the bus
driver, and a doctor who had treated the driver. The doctor had prescribed
Pyribenzamine for his patient (the bus driver) without warning him of
the possible side-effects (one of which was drowsiness) which affect about
twenty per cent of all persons using this medication. It was held on appeal
that whether or not the doctor was liable for plaintiff's injury was properly
a jury question.
Because of the brevity of the memorandum opinion, and because it
cites both Natanson and Mitchell, it is difficult to analyze Dirosse v. WebnT4
to determine what position the New York courts have taken. Where that
defendant treated the plaintiff's rheumatoid arthritis by administering gold
therapy, the trial court gave plaintiff a judgment based on the doctor's
failure to make a reasonable disclosure of known dangers incident to such
70. 139 So. 2d 61 (La. App. 1962).
71. Id. at 66-67.
72. 228 Md. 189, 179 A.2d 349 (1962).
73. 398 P.2d 14 (Wash. 1965).
74. 24 App. Div. 2d 510, 261 N.Y.S2d 623 (1965).
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treatment. The appellate court affirmed, pointing out (1) the lack of an
emergency and (2) that the medical profession recognized the possibility
of undesirable reaction. These comments would indicate that there must
have been expert testimony on these points, for otherwise the court would
not have been warranted in making such assumptions.
III. THE CANADIA DECISIONS
In LaCwnce v. B.71 the Supreme Court of Quebec cites Dalloz:70
The plastic surgeon must draw the attention of the client to
the risks of the procedure lacking which he disregards his obliga-
tions and commits a professional error for which he owes repara-
tions.
An earlier case decided by the same court was Bordier v. S.,77 holding:
[Olne must conclude that the defendant did not explain to the
plaintiff what he was going to do or if he did give explanations
they were so vague and brief that the plaintiff did not understand
the import and the meaning and could not as a result give a
valid consent.78
The rule was stated thus:
[T]he surgeon is finally the only one capable of deciding the true
value and, with all the consequences, whether the procedure is
called for and useful or inopportune and needless or even danger-
ous; and that in consequence he alone must assume the total re-
sponsibility excepting always his right to protect himself against
all reproach by permitting the patient to make the final decision
but not before fully and faithfully having informed the latter of
all the risks and all the possible consequences of the operation;
79
In Ontario, in the case of Kinney v. Lockwood Clinic, Ltd. 0 rev'd sub
nom. Kenney v. Lockwood,"' the trial court gave plaintiff a judgment for
$3000, holding it is a doctor's duty to enlighten a patient's mind as to
75. [19611 Que. C. S. 625. I am deeply indebted to Mrs. Vera Townsend of
the Humanities Department at the University of Missouri for assisting me in the
translation of the Canadian cases from the original French to the English shown
in .the text. Any errors in translation, however, are mine.
76. Cour d'appel, Paris, 13 janv. 1959, D.59.26, n.3, cited at 629.
77. 72 Que. C. S. 316 (1934).
78. Id. at 319.
"79. Id. at 320-21.
80. [1931] Ont. 438, [1931] 4 D.L.R. 906 (Ont. Sup. Ct.).
81. [1932J Ont. 141, [1932] 1 D.L.R. 507 (Ont. App. Div.).
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what the ailment is, the risks of operating promptly, of delaying, or not
operating at all; and where a surgeon knowingly minimizes the danger of
treatment to induce a patient to proceed and refrains from explaining the
advantages and disadvantages of an alternative course, he brings himself
within the field of liability for untoward results. Plaintiff was told she had
Dupuytren's contraction in her hand and that the proper treatment was
an operation to remove the cause of the trouble. As a result of the surgery,
she lost the full use of her hand and claimed that had she been warned
of this hazard, she would not have permitted the operation. On appeal
it was said, that the duty of a surgeon is to deal honestly with the patient
as to the necessity, character and importance of an operation and its prob-
able consequences and whether success might reasonably be expected to
ameliorate or remove the trouble, but such duty does not extend to warning
the patient of the dangers incident to, or possible in any operation nor to
details calculated to frighten or distress the patient. The court cautioned
that if a surgeon expresses his own honest belief he ought not to be judged
as if he had warranted a perfect cure nor be found derelict in his duty
as a result of meticulous criticism of his language, providing he is not guilty
of negligence in word or economy of truth.
The Nova Scotia Supreme Court held in Marshall v. CUrry8 2 that
trespass would not lie against a surgeon who, in the course of a surgical
operation, removes, without his patient's consent, an organ that he rea-
sonably believes should be removed in order to preserve the patient's life
or health. In this case, the doctor, in performing a hernia operation, re-
moved a diseased testicle. Experts testified that what defendant did was
"good surgery," probably meaning good surgical practice. The case cites
many American authorities on consent to medical procedures, but par-
ticularly deprecates the theory of Bennan v. Parsonnet,83 which strained
to conceptualize the doctor as having been appointed the patient's agent
to grant consent to necessary operative procedures that the surgeon became
aware of after the patient was under anaesthetic.
IV. THE ENGLISH DECISIONS
It was said in Slater v. Baker and Stapleton,:84
[I]ndeed it is reasonable that a patient should be told what is
82. [19331 3 D.L.R. 260 (Nov. Scot. Sup. Ct.).
83. 83 N.J.L. (54 Vroom) 20, 83 Atl. 948 (1912).
84. 2 Wils. K.B. 360, 95 Eng. Rep. 860, Micbaelmas Term, 8 Geo. III 1767.
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about to be done to him that he may take courage and put him-
self in such a situation as to enable him to undergo the operation.8
Undoubtedly, this court spoke before the modem practice of anaesthesiol-
ogy and felt that warning should be given so a patient would be given
the opportunity to steel himself for the shock of having a limb removed
or some other medical procedure performed while fully conscious.
More in point is an opinion that especially impressed this writer for
its logic, clarity, and brevity. It is the case of Bolam v. Frierm Hospital
Managemeitt Committee,"" in which the defendant administered electro-
shock therapy and plaintiff incurred severe resulting physical injury. The
allegation was that defendant neglected to apprise the patient of the
hazards of the treatment in obaining his consent. In instructing, the court
directed the jury that (1) a doctor is not negligent if he is acting in accord-
ance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical
men skilled in that particular art, merely because there is a body of such
opinion that takes a contrary view; (2) the jury might well think that
when a doctor was dealing with a mentally sick man and had a strong
belief that his only hope of cure was submission to electroshock therapy,
the doctor could not be criticized if, believing the dangers involved in the
treatment to be minimal, he did not stress them to his patient; and (3) in
order to recover damages for a failure to give warning, the plaintiff must
show not only that the failure was negligent but also that if he had been
warned he would not have consented to the treatment. The jury rendered
a verdict for the defendant.
A lecturer in Law at the University of Manchester has stated in the
official journal of the British Academy of Forensic Sciences:8 7
If a patient can prove that the nature of the treatment was
not explained to him and that a reasonable doctor or surgeon using
the skill of his profession would have given him the information
he lacked, he may establish a breach of the medical man's duty
towards him giving rise to an action in negligence. If he brings his
action in negligence, he must, as previously explained, show that
he has suffered damage and must therefore prove to the satisfaction
of the court that if he had been entrusted with the knowledge of
what the operation involved he would not have agreed to undergoit.ss
85. Id. at 362, 95 Eng. Rep. at 862.
86. 2 All E.R. 118 (Q.B.D. 1957).
87. Kloss, Consent to Medical Treatment, 5 ME., Sci. & LAw 89 (1965).
88. Id. at 97.
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Because courts have generally insisted upon expert medical testimony
to prove the standard of care that a medical practitioner must observe 8 9
and have generally held that it also takes expert testimony to prove causa-
tion in medical malpractice actions, 90 the legal profession more often than
not has been thwarted in attempts to guide such litigation to a successful
conclusion due to the conspiracy of silence among doctors plus the social
and economic pressures brought to bear on them not to testify against
another doctor.91 To escape these obstructions, the legal profession has
prosecuted medical malpractice cases on theories which have been held
to require no expert testimony: (1) res ipsa loqitur,92 which presently
is accepted in a minority of states in malpractice actions; (2) breach of
warranty or contract,9 3 (3) the common knowledge doctrine in instances
where any layman can tell that what has happened is below the standard
of care of the medical profession,94 and now (4) informed consent.95
Whether the doctrine of informed consent should completely eliminate
the need for expert testimony in all medical malpractice cases is a question
89. See authorities cited in note 6, supra. See also Myers, "The Battle of the
Experts"; A New Approach to an Old Problem in Medical Testimony, 44 NEB. L.
REV. 539 (1965).
90. Burke v. Miners Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 381 S.W.2d 758 (Ky. App. 1964);
Dowling v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 168 So.2d 107 (La. App. 1964); Morgan v. Rosen-
berg, 370 S.W.2d 685 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963); Puryear v. Porter, 153 Texas 82,
264 S.W.2d 689 (1954); Bowles v. Bourdon, 148 Texas 1, 219 S.W.2d 779 (1949);
Cf. Hasemeier v. Smith, 361 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. En Banc 1962).
91. McCleary, Torts in Missouri, 27 Mo. L. REv. 81, 87 (1962) suggests:
"Each medical case involves many factors which must be balanced, so that better
results may be achieved by not laying down strict legal rules which the medical
profession must follow."
92. Hasemeier v. Smith, supra note 91. Johnson, Medical Malpractice Doc-
trines of Res Ipsa Loquitur and Informed Consent, 37 CoLo. L. REV. 182 (1965).
93. Ball v. Mudge, supra note 66; Pearl v. Lesnick, 20 App. Div. 2d 761, 247
N.Y.S.2d 561 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
94. Larrimore v. Homeopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 181 A.2d 573 (Del. 1962);
Rauschelbach v. Benincasa, 372 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. 1963).
95. Oppenheim, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 11 CLEvE.-MAR. L.
REv. 249 (1962) discusses Woods v. Pommerening, 44 Wash. 2d 867, 271 P.2d 705
(1954) where medical testimony was in evidence that it was not the custom of
the profession to warn and ,that in advising of the risk involved, the judgment of
the individual doctor had to be exercised in the light of the mental and -psychoso-
matic makeup of the patient. The physician-author comments at 261: "The ab-
surdity of the trend towards a "more informed patient" is evident in the attempts
of physicians to comply, even where compliance is not in conformance with good
medical practice. This required 'informed' consent may create delay, apprehension,
and restrictions on the use of new techniques that will impair the progress of
medicine. It is questionable whether the 'average prudent man' will understand
and comprehend the following examples of informed consent forms used by a
prominent neurosurgeon in his practice: [followed by sample forms]."
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on which the courts have not yet agreed, but it appears that the majority
tend to side with the decisions of the Kansas Supreme Court rather than
the Missouri Supreme Court, preferring the Natanson and Williams views
(expert testimony required) to the Mitchell view (expert testimony not
required). Regardless of whether or not expert testimony is required to
prove negligence, the doctrine of informed consent does, at least in some
cases, abolish the necessity of proving a causal relation between negli-
gence and injury by expert testimony. Once negligence 6 has been estab-
lished and- injury has been shown, if the plaintiff states that if he had been
warned he would have refused the treatment, it would appear that sub-
stantial evidence of causation is in the case.07 Thus, if the patient is left
mentally incompetent or dies prior to trial so that he can not testify on
the issue of causation, there would be no way to prove the issue without
an admission on the part of defendant unless jurors are to be permitted
to speculate and conjecture as to what plaintiff might have done had he
been. warned.
VI. THE SOLUTION
In the final analysis, it probably would be preferable for the medical
profession to provide the legal profession with a source of unbiased medical
experts who will testify freely for a plaintiff in a malpractice suit. Then
96. The term was best explained by Judge Learned Hand in Conway v.
O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940) when he defined how the degree of care
is established: "The degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the
resultant of three factors: the liklihood that his conduct will injure others, taken
with the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and balanced against the interest
which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk. All these are practically not susceptible
of any quantitative estimate, and the second two are generally not so, even the-
oretically. For this reason a solution always involves some preference, a choice
between incommensurables, and it is consigned to a jury because their decision
is thought most likely to accord with commonly accepted standards, real or
fancied."
97. In Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 160-61, 136 S.E.2d 617, 622 (1964)
the court said: "The plaintiff attempted to testify that if the defendant had ad-
vised her the operation might involve paralysis of the vocal cords she would have
withdrawn the consent. The court excluded this testimony which presented a case
of looking backward. Perhaps the defendant with the benefit of the backward look
would not have performed the operation; but at the time decision was made to
operate the surgeon was dealing with a patient who had a diseased gland which
failed to secrete the proper amount of hormone. The medical experts, plaintiff's
witnesses, say surgery in such event is indicated. All cutting operations involve
some risks. Possible dangers of an operation had to be balanced against the certain
danger of a diseased thyroid. Decision had to be made before the operation. To
permit the plaintiff to change the decision afterwards is equivalent to looking at
the answer without solving the problem." The court affirmed the trial court's sus-
taining of a demurrer.
[Vol. 31
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the doctrines most despised by the medical fraternity--res ipsa loquitt and
"Informed Consent"-could be abandoned as vestigial structures, at least
for malpractice actions. The need, being erased, the special rules can be
excised as well.
Unless the physicians provide the solution, they will have to learn
to live with the results of the common law's efforts to provide relief for
the injured, and the latest "wonder drug" prescription seems to be:
"INFORMED CONSENT" P. R. N. 98
ADDENDUM
After this article had been completed, the Missouri Supreme Court
rendered its opinion after approximately seven months' consideration
of the case of Aiken z,. Clary,99 in which plaintiff appealed a unanimous
jury verdict for the doctor in litigation between a patient and his psychi-
atrist after the patient had severely adverse results (a delayed awaken-
ing and resultant organic brain damage) from insulin shock therapy. The
case went to trial solely on the issue of the doctor's alleged negligence in
failing to obtain an informed consent as required by Mitchell v. Robinson..Y°
Judge Finch, in a unanimous opinion of division two, said:
The question to be determined by the jury is whether defendant
doctor in that particular situation failed to adhere to a standard
of reasonable care. These are not matters of common knowledge or
within experience of laymen. Expert medical evidence thereon
is just as necessary as is such testimony on the correctness of
handling in cases involving surgery or treatment.'0 '
The decision proceeds to itemize the many considerations to be
taken into account in making a determination of how much warning of
collateral hazards should be given to a patient by a physician before the
patient's consent to treatment or surgery is "educated" or "informed."
The opinion concedes that proper warnings might range from "full dis-
closure of all risks which had any reasonable likelihood of occurring" to
"guarded or limited disclosure," but regardless of the difficulty of the
conclusion to be reached "it would be a medical judgment.' 02
98. A medical term used in prescriptions to designate a dosage to be taken
"according as circumstances may require."
99. No. 50,792, Mo., December 13, 1965.
100. 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960).
101. Supra note 99, at 8-9 of the original opinion.
102. Id. at 10.
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The holding of the case can be summarized by paraphrasing the
opinion as follows:
Expert testimony to show what disclosure a reasonable medical
practitioner would have made under the same or similar circum-
stances is a prerequisite to the plaintiff making a submissible case,
and, to the extent Mitchel is in conflict, it is disapproved.
Footnote six of the opinion suggests that it is conceivable for a
doctor in informing his patient to go so far as to indicate what other prac-
titioners would do, thus waiving the need for expert testimony. It should
be noted that any such waiver should be limited to the extent of the
warnings given. To follow any other rule would be to tell the practitioner
that he is only safe in minimal or no disclosure at one extreme, to avoid
the waiver, or the most complete and full disclosure at the other extreme,
to insure that he has proceeded as other competent doctors in his special-
ized field might under the same or similar circumstances.
Because counsel for plaintiff had relied on the somewhat ambiguous
language of Mitcel in not producing expert testimony, Aiken. was re-
manded for retrial giving the patient opportunity to do so. Apparently
the court thought fairness required this result.103 Appellate practice in
Missouri (and elsewhere) has normally followed the principle of decid-
ing the instant case and all future cases according to the rules of law
developed in the instant case even though that decision may have over-
ruled a prior decision upon which one of the parties relied at trial and
even though this result gives a somewhat retroactive effect to the appellate
court's decision. The theory probably is based on a public policy of allow-
ing a litigant to be the beneficiary of a change in the law which he has
brought about, it being felt that to do otherwise would offer no encourage-
ment to a potential appellant seeking to improve the law by asking the
court to reverse itself when he could not derive any benefit in his own
litigation though he had borne the expense. Few are so altruistic as to
be concerned only that others shall enjoy the benefits of a constantly
developing and improving legal system. This, however, is the subject of
some other writer at a later date.
103. M d. at 12. In the abstract, a plaintff who has successfully established a
prima fade case under the prior law but subsequently lost the jury verdict can in
no way be prejudiced by a ruling on appeal that more is required for a prima
facie case. Therefore fairness does not require the case to be remanded.
(Vol. 31
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In conclusion, after Aiken, it would appear that the only remaining
case not requiring expert testimony in this area of the law is Wood v.
Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962), which relied on Mitchell for
authority. 04 With Mitchell overruled by Aiken, Woods is left not only alone,
but unsupported, and it is now contrary to the majority of the legal writers
and to the decided cases of all of the state, English and Canadian Courts.
104. But see Scott v. Wilson, 396 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
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